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ABSTRACT 
Despite South Africa’s most liberal and progressive constitution, issues of racial wage 
gap (especially at the top management level in the private sector) are still very much 
with us. The government introduced the Employment Equity Act (EEA) to address 
racial imbalances perceived to be the consequence of the apartheid regime, and to 
promote equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment (Employment Equity Act 
19 no 55 1998). However, there is a public debate in South Africa on whether the 
earning distribution among the white and African race groups in the labour force 
improved after the enforcement of the EEA. This research contributes to this debate 
by attempting to investigate whether the EEA is doing enough to address racial wage 
gaps in the South African labour market. It uses Post-Apartheid Labour Market 
Services (PALMS) data, which exploits the sample surveys conducted by Statistics 
South Africa. Under the October Household Survey (OHS) release data range from 
1994 to 1999 and the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) latest release data from 
2008 to 2017.  
 
This research employs the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach to decompose the 
wage gap between different population groups for the period 1997 and 2015. The 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results for 2015 indicate that among the white and 
African sample the means for white workers are larger than those of African workers. 
Decomposition by occupation separately suggest that the average earnings of white 
workers still exceed that of African workers, however, the gap is not as big as it was 
previously. 
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1. CHAPTER 1  
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
South Africa is emerging from the scars of century-long institutionalised racisms during 
the apartheid era. During this era the majority of the population (especially Africans) 
were shunned from accessing quality education, better career opportunities, as well 
as privileged residential areas, both within urban and rural areas. Several years after 
the democratic government was elected, top management positions in privately owned 
companies in South Africa are still disproportionately occupied. One would expect the 
racial employment balance of the private sector in South Africa to reflect the racial 
composition of the country’s population. When the first majority-elected government 
came into power in 1994, white citizens occupied most of the top employment 
positions in private sectors.  
 
In an attempt to remedy this problem, the EEA1 was introduced in South Africa to 
alleviate issues of employment inequality and other related issues. The EEA was 
introduced to rectify racial imbalances perceived to be the consequence of the 
apartheid regime, and to promote equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment 
(Employment Equity Act 19 no 55 1998). The Department of Labour noticed that the 
compliance criteria, penalties for noncompliance, and the upper three management 
level targeting were not fully adhered to by some South African organisations. It 
proposed an action plan to ensure that the objectives envisaged within the original act 
were fulfilled. From the action plan, an amended act was drafted and signed into law 
in 2014 (Department of Labour, 2013).  
 
Despite the amended EEA being implemented, the racial wage gap continues to be a 
problem in some of South Africa’s organisations. Available statistics indicate that the 
objective of the Act in addressing inequality, especially at top management level, has 
not been fully met. According to Statistics South Africa (2014) only 17 percent of black 
                                               
1 For the purpose of this research, the concepts “Employment Equity Act”, “anti-discriminatory policy” and 
“Affirmative action” will be used interchangeably, even though the terms “Employment Equity Act” and 
“Affirmative action” are related they have different definitions. The purpose of the EEA is to attain equality in the 
workplace, while Affirmative action is the driver intended to fulfil this purpose (Mason, Williams & Cranner, 2009; 
Portnoi, 2003). 
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South Africans held skilled level positions, whereas white South Africans held 61 
percent of the skilled level positions. This imbalance in racial2 inequality in privately 
owned companies in South Africa endures after the implementation of EEA in 1998. 
However, racial inequality in the labour market is not unique to South Africa, it is a trait 
that is prevalent in both developed and developing countries. 
 
The aforementioned includes the United States of America, India, and Malaysia in 
various forms and guises; whether to the majority or minorities. In a developed country, 
such as the United States of America, discrimination towards the minority and white 
females continued. Regardless of the civil rights laws and guarantees, workers with 
the same qualifications had disparities regarding employment status, salaries, and job 
sector fulfilment for a different race and gender. Consequently, the Affirmative action 
policy was first used to describe actions to prevent discrimination and enhance 
opportunities for designated groups who had been previously discriminated against on 
the basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation, age, and so forth. 
 
The term Affirmative action was used to describe the Executive Order issued by 
President John F. Kennedy in the United States of America in 1961. The Executive 
Order was enforced in 1964 by President Lyndon Johnson. Affirmative action was 
presented as a system to rectify discrimination that had continued regardless of the 
civil rights laws and guarantees. Affirmative action policies were instated to ensure 
that the minorities of the USA had equal opportunities in the work place (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1994:374). Similar to developed countries, a number of developing 
countries suffer from the same social injustice.  
 
According to Das and Dutta (2007) before India’s independence in 1947 the country’s 
economic exclusion was apparent for different groups of citizens. These particular 
groups of citizens included the Backward Caste (BC), Scheduled Caste (SC), and 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) were discriminated against in various areas such as education, 
health, technology, and employment regardless of public outcry. However, shortly 
                                               
2 The term “racial inequality” refers to the persisting practice and processes of racial disparities that exist in the 
workplace (Acker, 2006).  
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after its independence, India enacted a constitution with prescripts that required equal 
opportunities for all citizens, particularly employment within the public sector.  
The affirmative action in India, which is the oldest in the world, has political, economic, 
and educational dimensions that seek to enhance representation from targeted groups 
or castes (Deshpande, 2000). 
 
Another country that suffered from economic segregation due to ethnic lines was 
Malaysia. The Bumiputra ethic group in Malaysia were economically marginalised and 
excluded from employment opportunities. The country adopted an Affirmative action 
policy in the 1960s with the aim to develop employment opportunities for the Bumiputra 
ethnic group. However, the Malaysians’ Affirmative action policy was found to be 
ineffective and inadequate in directing the economic progress to the Bumiputra.  
 
In 1971 the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced, this policy intended to 
guarantee the redress of the racial imbalance and deliver sincere economic change 
within the country. Both Malaysia and post-apartheid South Africa are similar in that 
while the majority of the population in both countries have political dominancy, they 
are disadvantaged economically – hence both instituting an extensive Affirmative 
action policy (Emsley & Mahadea, 1996).  
 
Thus, the question that this thesis will attempt to answer is whether the EEA is doing 
enough to address racial inequality through earning discrepancy among the white and 
African race in the South Africa’s labour market. In this section we shall discuss the 
background of the EEA and how it has been interpreted by other studies. The problem 
statement and question, as well as the aim of the research paper and the outline will 
be reviewed.   
 
1.2. BACKGROUND 
The EEA no 55 of 1998 was signed into law on the 6th of October 1998 by President 
Nelson Mandela and enforced on the 23rd of October 1998. According to Berry 
(2007:111) the EEA was established in South Africa to correct the racial imbalance in 
the labour market. The EEA was implemented to ensure that equal representation is 
attained at all categories of employment in the workforce (Employment Equity Act 19 
no 55 of 1998). Among other provisions, the Act stipulates that all employers in the 
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South Africa’s labour market must encourage fair opportunity and equal treatment, by 
eradicating unfair practices in the workplace (Department of Labour, 2013).  
 
According to Berry (2007:91) the EEA requires employers to conduct certain 
requirements, to ensure that all employees in the organisation may receive equal 
treatment. In order for the Act’s provision to be attained, employers are required to 
follow guidelines that the requirements can be measured against. These 
measurements are to be implemented through a plan referred to as the Employment 
Equity Plan.  
 
Similar to the Executive Order Affirmative action program of the USA the affirmative 
action plan is enforced, not only to help non-whites into employment, but to facilitate 
growth in the workforce hierarchy as well, per Leonard (1984:1). The measures 
stipulated in the plan are stated for the employer to grant appropriate and capable 
non-white employee’s equal opportunities and representation at all employment 
categories in the workplace. Measures must also include identifying and removing 
barriers that may affect non-white employees, and programmes that acknowledge 
diversity through training and developing non-white employees (Employment Equity 
Act 19 no 55 of 1998).  
 
Furthermore, the Employment Equity Plan must be analysed by the employer in 
accordance with its organisations’ objectives of a certain period of time and this plan 
must be prepared in the form of a report. In Surge’s (2004:2) research he highlights 
that it is essential for employers to provide a planned-out report stating goals and 
targets to integrate non-whites into their organisations. This report was to be submitted 
to the Department of Labour annually for an employer with more than 150 employees 
and every biannually for an employer with less than 150 employees (Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998).  
 
The Department of Labour has, however, expressed concern that there has been 
minimal participation of corporates in complying with the Employment Equity Plan 
(Department of Labour, 2013). For example, in 2012 a study was conducted by the 
Department of Labour that showed that the larger employers only contributed 
21.9 percent to the Employment Equity Plan and the smaller employers contributed 
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78.1 percent to the Employment Equity Plan (Department of Labour, 2013). From this 
study it appears that while the larger employers contribute 86.1 percent of South 
Africa’s labour market, minimal compliance of the Act has been attained (Department 
of Labour, 2013).  
 
Berry (2007) argues that the lack of participation in complying with the EEA derives 
from the employers experiencing difficulties in hiring and holding on to individuals from 
designated groups within their organisation. A survey of a random sample of 
employees in the automobile industry, one of the largest industries in South Africa was 
conducted by Berry (2007). This survey sought to understand the implementations of 
the Act within the industry. The study found that there should be a programme that 
seeks to support organisations to properly improve their employment equity 
objectives. 
 
From the stated background the interest is on the fact that previous studies have 
documented the continuation of racial inequality at leadership levels within 
organisations increase the inconsistent development for racial equality, which is one 
of the main causes for African employees’ lack of progression to top management 
(Booysen, 2007). However, the question remains whether the EEA is effective in 
earning distribution among white and African employees at top the management level 
in the private sector of South Africa.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTION 
The imbalance of racial employment in private companies in South Africa endures 
even after the government introduced the EEA which sought to rectify the century-long 
apartheid laws and practices that still characterise the workplace. Despite the act 
having been in place for close to 20 years, racial inequality in the private sector is still 
displaying imbalance in favour of white people (Booysen, 2007). The available 
statistics indicate that the objective of the Act in addressing earning inequality of the 
labour market has not been fully met. In 2015, African employees received seven 
percent of the South Africa’s labour markets total income, whereas white employees 
received 43 percent of South Africans labour markets total income (Human Rights SA, 
2015).  
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Some studies on racial discrimination in the workplace in South Africa have mainly 
looked at the attitude that employees have towards the enforcement of EEA 
(Oosthuizen and Naidoo, 2010). Others have assessed employees’ perception 
regarding the EEA (Esterhuizen and Martins, 2008). Unfortunately, these have not 
investigated the effectiveness3 of the EEA. With the exception of Booysen (2007), who 
analyses the barriers of executing EEA and retaining black management in the South 
African organisations. While Burger and Jafta (2006, 2010), Fredericks and Yu (2017, 
2018), and Rospabéa (2002) assesses racial discrimination in employment, 
occupation, and wages in South Africa post-apartheid.  
 
This study contributes to the literature by investigating the effectiveness of the EEA. 
The Government introduced the EEA to address racial imbalances perceived to be the 
consequence of the apartheid regime and to promote equal opportunity and fair 
treatment in employment (Employment Equity Act 19 no 55 1998). Thus, narrowing 
the racial wage gap at top management level and by disaggregating the earning gap 
of each skilled occupation in the private sector in South Africa.  
 
1.4. AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
Addressing inequality is an important objective of legislation, as South Africa has a 
history of racial discrimination that denied opportunities for socio-economic progress 
for the majority of the population. Post 1994, the need to address such imbalances is 
a key aspect of ensuring inclusiveness and redistribution that enhances reduction of 
poverty and income inequality.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned, addressing such imbalances is a key factor in 
ensuring that ownership, management, and drivers of economic growth and activities 
are not skewed nor concentrated in the hands of a few. In 2015, 72.4 percent and 10.8 
percent top management positions of South African private companies were occupied 
                                               
3 The term “effectiveness” will be used to determine the success of the EEA in closing the earning gap among the 
White and African people in managerial positions of the private sector (Booysen, 2007). 
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by white and African population4 respectively (Commission for Employment Equity, 
2016).   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework that seeks to assess the impact 
the EEA has in addressing racial wage gap at top management5 level in the private 
sector6 of the South African labour market, disaggregating the earning gap by 
occupation.  
 
1.5. OUTLINE 
The paper is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the background, research 
problem and question, research objectives, and the significance of the research. 
Chapter 2 comprise theoretical and empirical literature on racial employment bias at 
the workplace. Chapter 3 discusses the research design and methodology of the 
research. Chapter 4 provides a statistical model and present the regression results. 
Chapter 5 provides a recommendation and conclude this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Eventhough the term “Black people” in the Act is referred to as a generic term which encompasses, Coloured 
people, Indian people, and recently the inclusion of South African-born Chinese people (Employment Equity Act 
19 no 55 1998). For the scope of this research it will be narrowed down to Black African people, because according 
to the Commission employment equity report of 2012-2013 this is the designated group which is most 
underrepresented in the workforce (Department of Labour, 2013). Further the work Black is used interchangeably 
with “African”. 
 
5 Top management” is classified as the skilled level which includes manager, professional, and technician 
occupations of the workforce (Department of Labour, 2013). 
6 Furthermore the “private sector” that will be analysed for the purpose of this research will be defined as the 
formal non- agricultural industries, such as mining, utility construction, whole sale and retail trade, transport and 
the financial sector 
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2. CHAPTER 2  
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A huge body of literature (theoretical and empirical) has attempted to determine the 
presence and magnitude of the labour market racial discrimination in the workplace. 
This section will briefly review both theoretical and empirical evidence pertaining to 
racial inequality in the workplace. 
 
2.2. THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a wide-range of economic literature regarding the presence and magnitude 
of labour market racial discrimination in the workplace, (refer to Neumark (1988), 
Becker (1971, 2010), Arrow (1972), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1982), Phelps (1972), 
Hellerstein, et al., (1997), Bendick, et al., (1993), Lundberg (1991), Coate and Loury 
(1993), Leonard (1984), Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974), Holzer (1996), McCall 
(1972), Reder (1972), and Spence (1974)). Due to space constraints this section will 
only focus on the Becker-style model and mention in passing subsequent refinements 
of this theory. 
 
2.2.1. Theories of racial inequality at the workplace  
The theory of discrimination was originally advanced by Becker (1971), and 
subsequently refined by other scholars, such as Arrow (1972), Phelps (1972), Stiglitz 
(1973), and so forth. Becker took the view that discrimination reflects the taste of white 
employers, employees, and consumers. Specifically, these economic agents are 
willing to pay to avoid contact with black counterparts. Thus, those subjected to 
discrimination (black people in this case) would accept lower wages in order to be 
employed and accepted as employees (see Lang and Manove, 2011 for a concise 
review of Becker’s model 
 
Sociologists deemed Becker’s account of labour market discrimination as 
unsatisfactory as it “…reduces patterns of individual behaviour to (collectively shared) 
preferences which are constant over time and context”. Keuschnigg and Wolbring 
(2016:5) conclude that: “It is left open to future inquiry which characteristics people 
actually discriminate on and, more importantly, how these preferences evolved and 
under which conditions they translate into unequal treatment. Consequently, one 
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might warrant a theoretical explication of who bears discriminatory tastes and where 
these preferences originated from”. 
 
Refinements of this theory (see Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972)), suggest that 
discrimination is underpinned by certain beliefs. In general, firms believe that black 
workers are on average not as productive as white workers. As a result, black workers 
command less wages than their white counterparts. However, when firms come to 
realise that both black and white workers are equally productive, they will stop 
discriminating against black workers (unless they decide to deliberately use their 
market power against black workers).  
 
More recent refinements of Becker’s theory (Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010)) 
introduce the concept of identity into the model. The idea here is that identity is likely 
to be threatened if others’ presence or behaviour is in sharp contrast with one’s own 
definition of the situation.  
 
2.3. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bjerk (2007) examined the wage gap in the USA’s overall labour market and 
occupational level, among the white and African American race. Using the database 
from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 and the Random Generalized 
Least Squares (RGLS) regression, the authors found that wage gap among the white 
and African American race exists in the overall labour market. However, upon 
scrutinizing by occupational level, the results reveal that the wage gap is reduced in 
the white-collar occupation when compared to the blue-collar occupation. 
Furthermore, the results reveal that educational skill is the main contributor to the 
wage gap among the races in both occupational levels. 
 
Similarly, Cotton (1988) attempted to estimate the wage disparity among the white and 
black males over the age of 16 within the labour market of the North-eastern, Mid-
western, South-western, and Southern states of the USA. The author used the Public 
Use samples and selected one percent from the sample, which comprised of 21,341 
white males and 2,785 black males. The study used both the Non-discriminatory 
decomposition and the Oaxaca decomposition model by treated for white male 
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advantage and black male disadvantage and found that white males have some’ 
advantage than black males’.  
 
The results of the Non-discriminatory decomposition equation were as follows; the 
explained component accounted for 49 percent of the wage gap, whilst the 
unexplained component when accounting for white males’ advantage accounts for 
22.5 percent and black males disadvantage accounts for 28 percent. The Oaxaca 
decomposition model revealed when treating for white males advantage the explain 
component accounts four percent of the wage gap, whilst 95 percent is from the 
unexplained component. Further when Oaxaca decomposition treats for black males’ 
disadvantage, the explained component accounts for 52 percent of the wage gap and 
49 percent of the wage gap is accounted for by the unexplained component.   
 
Leonard (1984), assessed the effect of affirmative action on employment in the USA. 
He used the establishment – level Equal Employment Opportunity -1 (EEO -1) report 
and sampled over 68,000 private sectors between the period of 1974 to 1980. Using 
multiple regressions, the author undertook statistical comparison between private 
sectors subject to affirmative action known as the federal contractor establishments 
and the private sectors that are not subjected to comply with affirmative action known 
as the non-contractor establishments.  
 
The authors found that in the federal contractor establishments the African American 
race grew due to the affirmative action policy. The author broke down the proportionate 
share of employees in contractors and non-contractors by skilled occupation and 
industries. It was found that a higher share of skilled occupations is found in non-
contractor establishments. Further industries such as mining, construction, service, 
transportation, and finance are found in contractor establishments.  
 
Whilst agriculture, textiles, wholesale trade, lumber, and wood are found more in non-
contractor establishments. Finally, the author analysed wage change in contractor 
establishments throughout the same period and found that African American males’ 
wage ratio to white males’ earnings ratio grew by 2.3 percent from 0.68 percent to .077 
percent respectively.  
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In their study Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia, and Vanneman (2001) used the 1975-93 
waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine the magnitude of 
racial discrimination of the US workplace. Their study employed the random effect 
model estimation and focused on earning disparities among African American males 
and females compared to white males and females at top management level. Hourly 
earnings were used as the dependent variable, and three dummy variables for each 
worker to assert whether workers exceed the white males’ 25th, 50th, and 75th earning 
percentiles. The authors found that the earning gap was evident for African American 
females in all three earning percentiles, while the African American males had no 
noteworthy difference to the white males in all three earning percentiles. 
 
When focusing predominantly on work experience against all three earning percentiles 
the authors found that at the 75th earnings percentile, if white males’ work experience 
increases by one year their probabilities rises by 0.753 percent. Whereas white 
females’ odds increase by 0.512 percent; African American males’ odds increases by 
0.527 percent, whilst African American females’ chances only increase by 0.0159 
percent if her work experience increases by one year.  
 
The 25th earnings percentile reflects a different set of results; the study shows that at 
the lower earnings levels white females’ probabilities of obtaining higher wages 
increases over the course of their work experience. For instance, for an additional 
year’s work experience white females’ odds of higher earnings increase by 1.074 
percent, white males’ odds increase by 0.721 percent, African American female’s odds 
increase by 0.804 percent, and African American male’s odds increase by 0.651 
percent.  
 
At the 50th earnings percentile African American females’ odds of improved earnings 
after an additional year’s work experience increases by 0.366 percent, whilst white 
males’ odds increase by 0.755 percent, and the African American males at 0.73 
percent. White females’ odds of higher earnings at this level depict that there is no 
substantial difference from the white males’ earnings at 0.727 percent; in fact, their 
earning trajectory shows equal improvement with every year’s work experience.     
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A study conducted by Dobbin, Kalev, and Kelly (2006) assessed the effectiveness of 
the Affirmative action policy in hiring and promoting African men and women and the 
ability of employers to adhering to Affirmative action policies. Employing the 
longitudinal survey, similar to Hsiao (1986) the fixed effect model with pooled cross-
sectional time-series model was used. The study found that the various diversity 
programs had significant discrepancies.  
 
Organisations with affirmative action plans in place led to an eight percent decrease 
in managerial positions for white males. Whilst the other groups increased by nine 
percent (white females) and four percent (African American males). The outcome of 
organisations that had a diversity committee prompted a positive impact for most 
groups. 
 
The author found that training African American females had a negative impact by 
decreasing their odds to be in managerial positions by seven percent, and diversity 
evaluations showed a positive outcome for white females at six percent, however 
African American males decreased by eight percent. The network and mentoring 
programs proved to yield moderate results where white females benefited from the 
network program, while the African American and white males did not. Conversely the 
mentoring diversity programs produced positive results only to the African American 
females.  
 
Das and Dutta (2007) explored discrimination of India’s labour market through 
analysing earning disparities among the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Backward cast 
(BC) alongside the general caste (GC). Their study excluded the Scheduled Tribe (ST) 
from the model due to conceptual reasons. Using the large-scale employment survey 
for the period of July 2004 to June 2005, the authors considered the conventional 
Oaxaca decomposition (1973) model as a primary evaluation tool.  
 
The researchers conducted an average weekly wage at occupational level by social 
group and found that for all occupational levels the SCs and BCs earn less than the 
GCs. The wage gap is especially higher at skilled levels such as professional, 
technical, and administrative occupations. Additionally, the authors conducted a wage 
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regression model differentiating between the regular and casual workers category in 
various occupations.  
 
The results indicate that for the professional or technical occupations, in the regular 
workers category, the BC had a higher coefficient of 0.26 percent, followed by GC at 
0.22 percent, and lastly by ST with a coefficient of 0.20 percent. Whereas in the casual 
workers category, the GC had a higher coefficient of 0.19 percent, followed by both 
the BC and SC by 0.07 percent. The administrative occupation depicted a different set 
of results for the regular workers category, they observed the GC obtaining a higher 
result of 0.49 percent, followed by BC with a coefficient of 0.40 percent, lastly SC at 
0.36 percent.  
 
The casual workers category reflects a different set of results where the SC has a 
higher coefficient of 0.15 percent, followed by BC with -0.02 percent, and lastly GC at 
-0.006 percent. The study examines the decomposition of the average social group’s 
wage gap. The overall results for the regular workers category find that the difference 
between the SC and GC is 0.37 percent. Subsequently; the explained component is 
larger than the unexplained component at 0.25 percent and 0.13 percent respectively.  
 
However, the overall difference between the BC and GC is 0.33 percent; 
consequently, the explained component is larger than the unexplained component at 
0.20 percent and 0.13 percent. The overall results for the casual workers category find 
that the difference between the SC and GC is 0.10 percent; the explained component 
is larger than the unexplained component at 0.10 percent and -0.01 percent 
respectively. Similarly, the overall difference between the BC and GC is 0.50 percent 
the explained component is larger than the unexplained component at 0.07 percent 
and -0.02 percent respectively. South Africa can learn from the gradual improvement 
of the SC population at the top management level, through adopting a stricter quota 
system. 
 
Lee (2012) investigates the progress of Affirmative action in Malaysia, for the 
Bumiputra people, particularly at top management level. The author used census data. 
The results obtained by Lee (2012) show that there was a significant increase of the 
indigenous citizens of Malaysia at top management level from 1970 to 1995, from 22.4 
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percent to 36.8 percent respectively. However, from 1995 to 2000 representation 
remained stagnant at 37 percent. Lee (2012) found that affirmative action at top 
management level in Malaysia during the 1990s had gained traction. However, 
representation of the Bumiputra people remained flat during the 2000s. This flat growth 
was further caused by the flexibility of government, where the country’s wealth was in 
the hands of the non-Malaysians. 
 
Burger and Jafta (2006) used October Household for the period 1995 to 1999, Labour 
Force Annual Survey from 2000 to 2004, and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to 
examine racial discrimination in the labour market post-Apartheid South Africa. Their 
results suggest that the employment gap increased from 0.32 percent in 1997 to 0.38 
percent in 2003 among the races with an incomplete secondary education.  
 
The study reveals that this increase was due to a consistently large unexplained 
component. They also found that during 1995 to 1997 Africans with educational 
attainment have the likely odds of receiving employment. Conversely, the white race 
received employment irrespective of educational attainment. The authors show that 
during 1995 to 2000 the employment gap among the two races rose significantly and 
then stabilized thereafter. This was predominantly driven by the large unexplained 
component from 1997 to 2003.  
 
When the authors decomposed skilled occupation attainment, they found that the 
unexplained component had increased illustrating that the variance was due to 
discrimination, especially during 1997 at 0.29 percent and 1998 at 0.4 percent. In the 
wage gap model the results show that the affirmative action policy had a slight effect 
in reducing the wage gap throughout the period. The decomposition results highlighted 
that the unexplained component was the biggest contributor to the persisting total gap 
sitting above 1.4 percent from 2001 to 2004.  
 
A recent study by Burger and Jafta (2010) investigated racial discrimination in the 
labour market post-Apartheid in South Africa. They extended their examination to 
2006, investigating employment gap and wage gap. Their results showed that in 2006 
the probability of Africans obtaining employment increased and the employment gap 
between the African and white race group declined to 0.28 percent. This decline was 
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driven predominantly by the decline in unexplained component. Further, the wage gap 
results showed a slight reduction for the white to African wage gap decreased to 1.2 
percent. 
  
Fredericks and Yu (2017, 2018) investigated the progress for transformation in the 
labour market through assessing the impact of Affirmative action on employment 
discrimination from 1997 to 2015. Similarly, the authors used October Household 
Annual Survey from 1997 to 1999, Labour Force Annual Survey from 2000 to 2007, 
Quarterly Labour Force Annual Survey from 2008 to 2016 and the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition; and integrated the employment and high skilled occupation gap 
model.  
 
Overall, the results highlight that the employment gap among the white and black race 
had a minor reduction; however, the unexplained component depicted a 50 percent 
wage gap. They found that African males depict a considerably higher chance of 
employment than African females, though the employment probability of the African 
males decrease from 0.15 percent in 1997 to 0.05 percent in 2015. Therefore, 
education increases the probability of employment for the African race.  
 
According to the Oaxaca results the employment gap among the African and white 
races showed an increase from 0.31 percent in 1997 to 0.41 percent in 2002, 
subsequently there was a downward movement that resulted in 2014 being at 0.25 
percent. Both the explained and unexplained showed a declining trend, where the 
explained component declined from 0.21 percent in 2006 to 0.12 percent in 2013. The 
unexplained component declined from 0.21 percent in 2002 to 0.11 percent in 2011; 
however, results showed a rise to 0.25 percent in 2015.  
 
Similarly, in the high skilled occupation gap model the researchers found that males 
from both races have a lower probability of being employed in a high skilled occupation 
than females. Specifically, in 1997 African males were 10 percent less probable to 
acquire high skilled occupation than females. However, in 2015 these results changed 
where males had a high probability of attaining high skilled occupation than females.  
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Education increases the probability of high skilled employment for both races, 
especially the higher learning degree. While, the Western Cape Province showed that 
the African race had a low probability of receiving high skilled employment. Regarding 
the Oaxaca results the high skilled occupation gap among the African and white race 
increased during 1997 to 2015 from 0.29 percent to 0.40 percent respectively. 
Consequently, this gap predominantly results from the unexplained component. There 
was an upward trend in 1997 from 0.7 percent to 0.17 percent in 2015. However, the 
explained component had a marginal increase from 0.22 percent to 0.23 percent 
during the same period, this outcome further implies a rise in racial discrimination over 
the years. 
 
Rospabéa (2002) found that even though workers may have the same qualifications 
there are racial disparities in employment status, remuneration, and industry. The 
author adds that inequality in the South African private sector is also explained by the 
disproportionate education and skills levels of the white and African population group; 
however, he further proves that the disparities are largely due to racial discrimination. 
 
Rospabéa’s (2002) work shows that although the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living 
Standards and Development (PSLSD) and the OHS 1999 show that the employment 
rate for whites declined from 95.5 percent to 93.5 percent between 1993 and 1999; 
while that of the Africans increased from 61.5 percent to 62.7 percent, the employment 
gap between the two races in this period is still hovering around 30 percent.  
 
The author further analyses the gap between the white and African race in terms of 
work categories including managers, professionals, and technicians during the same 
period. This disparity is mirrored in the skills level across industries as the author finds 
that although the proportion of whites in highly skilled positions increased by a smaller 
percentage (50% to 53%) than that of Africans (7% to 12%) in the same period, the 
gap between the two racial groups remained high at 40 percent. 
 
Mwabu and Schultz (2000) assessed the wage difference among races in the labour 
market of South Africa in 1993. They used the database from Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development which consist of 9,000 households in South Africa 
 17 
and a sample of 25,569 labour force individuals in the formal sector, with non-wealth 
and educational attainment.  
 
Using Ordinary Least Square Regression their findings suggest that when racial 
discrimination is eliminated in the South Africa’s labour market, the wage gap among 
the white and black race will diminish. The authors also found that African men with a 
primary education received 8.4 percent investment returns, secondary education 
investment 15.8 percent, and higher secondary educational investment 29.4 percent.  
 
African women received 6.2 percent for primary educational attainment, 24.9 percent 
for secondary, and 39.6 percent for higher secondary educational investment. The 
results for white men revealed no significant returns for primary school attainment, 
while secondary and higher secondary revealed a return of 8.4 percent and 15.1 
percent respectively. For white women primary school attainment revealed a negative 
outcome of -3.4 percent, secondary school 5.2 percent, and higher secondary returns 
13.9 percent. 
 
Thomas (2002) has a similar observation, where she reviews the EEA of South Africa 
and attempts to focus on the fundamental concerns that organisations are faced with. 
The author notes that the legislation has been criticised by employers, as foreign 
investors are reluctant to come to South Africa as the labour market is heavily 
regulated. Secondly, employers find this to be an administrative burden and costly in 
ensuring the legislation has been adhered to. Lastly, employers are concerned with 
the legislation being unclear. The author concludes that Government needs to pay 
attention to concerns raised by employers and to administer assistance through 
creatively improving the legislation.  
 
An in-depth study is provided by Robertshaw and Thomas (1999), which looks at 
attitudes and perception of employees, concerning Employment Equity at managerial 
levels of an organisation. They conducted their research in a form of a qualitative 
analysis which renders a series of questions posed to employees. The authors found 
that EEA is able to change the appearance of top management in South Africa  
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What seems to emerge from these studies is that while a great deal of empirical work 
has been undertaken in this field there is no consensus regarding the impact of 
affirmative action on the labour market indicators and that the impact is largely 
influenced by the dataset or the method used. Therefore, there is room for further 
studies (such as ours) to shed further light on this issue and explore the topic from 
different angles.  
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3. CHAPTER 3 
3.1. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section presents a detailed account of the data source, empirical approach 
adopted, and some descriptive analysis.  
 
3.2. DATA SOURCE 
To explore the impact of the EEA on the racial wage gap at top management level in 
the private sector of South Africa, we exploit the PALMS (PALMS version 3.2). This 
dataset synchronises various labour market variables from various surveys such as 
OHS, Labour Force Surveys (LFS), QLFS, and Project for Statistics on Living 
Standards and Development (PSLSD) (Kerr & Wittenberg, 2014).  
 
The aim of PSLSD was to assist policy improvement for a democratic nation and to 
further assist the “Government of National Unity’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme” (SALDRU, 2008). The Statistics South Africa household survey consists 
of the OHS (1994 to 1999 also known as wave 2-6), LFS (from 2000 to 2007 or wave 
7-22) as well as the QLFS which is from 2008 to 2017. The OHS, LFS, and the QLFS 
are nationally representative data describing labour force participation such as the 
employed and the unemployed market using the sample of the working age of 15-65.  
 
The fundamental difference between the three waves is that the initial wave (OHS) 
was conducted annually, while the second survey (LFS) was conducted biannually 
and the last was conducted quarterly. The QLFS is seen as an improvement to the 
previous two waves in terms of sampling, data capturing, process system, as well as 
weighting of variables.  
 
To analyse the impact of the EEA on racial wage gap at top management level, we 
draw insights from many authors such as Armstrong and Steenkamp (2008), Burger 
et al. (2006), Fredericks et al. (2017), and Shepherd (2008). Further to ensure large 
sufficient sample size, this study will draw data from two years; 1997 the year before 
EEA was enforced and 2015 the year after the amendment of EEA.  
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Variables from the dataset that will be utilized for the empirical analysis of both years 
will include; age, age squared, level of education, gender, race of the individual, marital 
status, residential areas, job union membership, industries dummies, provincial 
dummies, and occupation dummies (see table 3.1) describing these variables.  
 
As the aim is to assess the impact of the EEA on the racial wage gap at top 
management level in the private sector; domestic workers occupation, self-employed, 
and the informal and public sectors will be excluded from this study. 
 
Table 3.1: Variable Description  
Variables Type Description 
Dependent variable    
In Wages Continuous Log of real earnings 
Independent variable    
Education Continuous Year of Schooling  
Age Continuous Age in years 
Age2 Continuous Age squared 
Widow/widower Dummy 1 = widower, 0 otherwise 
Divorced or separated Dummy 1 = divorced/ separated, 0 = otherwise 
Never married Dummy 1 = never married, 0 = otherwise 
Rural Dummy Individual residing in rural (1/0) 
Mining and quarrying Dummy Individual in Mining and quarrying industry (1/0) 
Manufacturing Dummy Individual in Manufacturing industry (1/0) 
Construction Dummy Individual in Construction industry (1/0) 
Trade Dummy Individual in Trade industry (1/0) 
Transport Dummy Individual in Transport industry (1/0) 
Finance Dummy Individual in Finance industry (1/0) 
Services Dummy Individual in Services industry (1/0) 
Eastern cape Dummy Individual residing in Eastern cape (1/0) 
Northern cape Dummy Individual residing in Northern cape (1/0) 
Free state Dummy Individual residing in Free state (1/0) 
KwaZulu-Natal Dummy Individual residing in KwaZulu-Natal (1/0) 
North west Dummy Individual residing in North west (1/0) 
Gauteng    Dummy Individual residing in Gauteng (1/0) 
Mpumalanga    Dummy Individual residing in Mpumalanga (1/0) 
Limpopo    Dummy Individual residing in Limpopo (1/0)  
Job union no Dummy 1 = Job union no, 0 otherwise 
Female Dummy 1 = Female, 0 = Otherwise 
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Professional Dummy Individual in Professional occupation (1/0) 
Technician Dummy Individual in Technician occupation (1/0) 
Clerk Dummy Individual in Clerk occupation (1/0) 
Service workers Dummy Individual in Service workers occupation (1/0) 
Skilled agriculture Dummy Individual in Skilled agriculture occupation (1/0) 
Craft  Dummy Individual in Craft occupation (1/0) 
Plant operators Dummy Individual in Plant operator’s occupation (1/0) 
Elementary Dummy Individual in Elementary occupation (1/0) 
 
3.3. METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition model framework 
Following Burger and Jafta (2006), we adopted the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
method which essentially “…breaks down the average wage gap existing between two 
demographic groups into two summands. The first indicates the differences in 
qualifications, the differences that are explained by the model. The second indicates 
differences in the structure of the model, such as those differences that are not 
explained; the unexplained difference is an estimate of discrimination in the labour 
market” (Ospino et al 2010:240). As a way of setting the scene to this, we commence 
this analysis with a basic model of wage determination:  
 InW = b +∑xi	βi + µ                                     
(3.1) 
 
Where InW shows the natural log of monthly earnings/wages for individual 
characteristics (X),  
 
In order to determine the wage differential between white and African, the average of 
log of wage is differentiated between the two races, expressed as follows: 
 In	W,w − 	In	W,/ = 	X1w	bw	–X1 /	b/		                (3.2) 
 
Where lnW represents average wage, X is the vector of the labour market 
characteristics; b is the estimated coefficients of the market’s evaluation characterized 
in X. The W and A subscription are for the white and African racial group, and error 
term.  The wage differential between whites and Africans can be re-written as: 
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  In	W,w − InW1 / = ∑(X,4	–	X,/	)β4 + [∑X,/ (β4 − β/) + (α4 − α/)]	           (3.3)               
 
Where InW1 4	and InW1 /			are log wages of whites and Africans, respectively,  𝑋<= and 𝑋<> are averages of all variables known to influence wage differentials (such as years 
of education, age, geographical areas, marital status, occupation, and so forth); and 𝛽= and 𝛽> the estimated coefficients for whites and Africans, respectively. 
 	∑(𝑋<=	–	𝑋<>	)𝛽= represent the part of the gap that is explained by racial differences in 
mean wage-related attributes. 
 	[∑𝑋<> (𝛽= − 𝛽>) + (𝛼= − 𝛼>)] is the part of the gap explained by differences in returns 
to wage-related attributes (on the left side) and differences in intercepts (right side). 
 
3.4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
3.4.1. Kernel density estimates of the log of earnings 
This section presents the kernel density estimates of the log of earnings for the two 
race groups by occupations (manager, professional, and technician), for the period of 
1997 and 2015. It first analyses the kernel density estimate for 1997, the year before 
the implementation of the EEA; and subsequently, the year after former president 
Jacob Zuma signed an amended EEA into law in 2015.  
 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the kernel density estimates of the first skilled occupation 
manager for 1997. From this graph, it is apparent that the earning distribution of the 
White population group is higher, as its graph leans heavily to the right while the 
average earning of the African race group appears to be more on the left. 
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Figure 3.1: Log of earnings by race and manager occupation 1997 
 
Figure 3.2 displays the kernel density function for the second skilled level professional 
occupation for the period of 1997. The kernel densities of both races for the 
professional’s occupation is similar to the manager occupation in that the white 
population group has a higher earning mean than the African race.  
 
The kernel density is located to the right and the graph peaks around the mean, further 
illustrating a high concentration of earning distribution. On the other hand the kernel 
density for the African population, is skewed to the left.   
 
 
Figure 3.2: Log of earnings by race and professional occupation 1997 
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Figure 3.3 indicates the kernel density estimates for the third skilled level (technician 
occupation) for the period of 1997. The kernel density for the white population is 
slightly similar to the first two occupations where the graph leans to the right. 
Correspondingly, the kernel density of the African population group is skewed to the 
left, the graph peaks around the mean, further illustrating a high concentration of 
earning distribution.  
 
Figure 3.3: Log of earnings by race and technician occupation 1997 
 
Figure 3.4 displays the kernel density estimates of the first skilled occupation 
(manager) for 2015. What is prominent in this graph is that, while the average earnings 
of the white population group remained significantly higher in 2015, the kernel density 
is positioned to the right African population group appears to have experienced a 
rightward shift during this period. 
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Figure 3.4: Log of earnings by race and manager occupation 2015 
 
Figure 3.5 displays the kernel density function for the second skilled occupational level 
(professionals) for the period of 2015. Similarly, the kernel density for the African 
population indicates a slight shift to the centre, a degree of overlap is observed.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Log of earnings by race and professional occupation 2015 
 
Figure 3.6 (which shows the kernel density function for the third skilled occupational 
level (technician) for the period of 2015)) follows a similar pattern to the 2015 to kernel 
density estimates, and indicates a degree of overlap. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Log of earnings by race and technician occupation for 2015 
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4. CHAPTER 4 
4.1. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical results of this research are demonstrated firstly, by the OLS regression 
which estimated the log of real earnings for various occupations; and for the African 
and white race groups for the period of 1997 and 2015. We followed the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition regression of the average white-African real earnings gap, 
total sample and by occupation, observing the same period.  
 
4.2. OLS EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4.1 presents the OLS results of log of real earnings for various occupations for 
the period of 1997. We find from the results that there are some variables that appear 
to be important when discussing earnings. The results suggest that certain variables; 
such as age, age squared, level of education, gender, race, and provincial dummies 
(like KwaZulu-Natal) are important in explaining the real earnings. On the other hand, 
other variables, such as marital status, residential areas, industries dummies, some 
provincial dummies, and job union membership, have no impact on real earnings. 
 
Our variable of interest (race dummy) presents a positive and significant estimate on 
real earnings. Specifically, the results show that the white race earn more than their 
African counterparts, consistent with our theoretical expectation and in line with similar 
studies in this field such as that of Burger and Jafta (2006). This is depicted by the 
positive coefficient that demonstrates that this race has fairly higher earnings than the 
African race group.  
 
Additionally, the estimation of manager occupation shows that the magnitude of the 
coefficient of the white race strongly determines the dependent variable than the other 
two occupations. More specifically, we observe that the white race variable is 
statistically significant to the model, which indicates that this variable is directly 
associated with the increase in earnings. 
 
In line with human capital theory, education is found to be positively associated with 
earnings. The more educated an individual is the higher the earnings he/she will 
receive. Expectedly, female variable, gender variable is negative and significant 
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across occupations. That is to say that females earn less than their male counterparts, 
regardless of the occupation.  
 
This finding is corroborated by many studies in the literature, such as Rospabe (2002) 
and Shepherd (2008). In line with previous studies (Fredericks and Yu (2017) we find 
that age of the individual is important in explaining the earnings. Specifically, age is 
positively associated with earnings, while age squared is mostly negatively associated 
with earnings.  
 
The dummy variables that are statistically insignificant from Table 4.1 include marital 
status, residential areas, job industries, provinces, and job union membership. This 
outcome may not entirely be a true representation of the model and the ambiguous 
results may be due to the low sample size.  
 
Table 4.1: OLS regression on log of real earnings for 1997 
  Managers Professionals Technician 
 Coef. SE t Coef. SE t Coef. SE t 
Age 0.07 0.03 2.48 0.07 0.03 2.61 0.03 0.03 1.01 
Age2 0.00 0.00 -2.22 0.00 0.00 -2.90 0.00 0.00 -0.66 
Education 0.06 0.02 4.19 0.11 0.02 4.64 0.10 0.02 5.36 
Widow/widower 0.17 0.33 0.53 0.22 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.35 0.01 
Divorce or 
separated 
0.18 0.23 0.79 0.26 0.25 1.04 0.32 0.19 1.66 
Never married -0.12 0.12 -0.95 0.00 0.16 -0.01 -0.16 0.11 -1.38 
Rural -0.06 0.13 -0.45 -0.20 0.18 -1.11 -0.02 0.12 -0.15 
Mining & quarry 0.14 0.23 0.63 0.52 0.32 1.62 0.02 0.31 0.07 
Manufacturing 0.29 0.21 1.37 0.37 0.31 1.19 0.04 0.27 0.13 
Construction 0.21 0.28 0.74 0.76 0.48 1.59 -0.30 0.33 -0.90 
Trade    0.22 0.20 1.11 0.32 0.37 0.87 -0.20 0.27 -0.74 
Transport 0.46 0.27 1.70 0.64 0.38 1.70 -0.24 0.28 -0.85 
Finance    0.31 0.22 1.40 0.52 0.31 1.67 0.06 0.27 0.21 
Services    -0.15 0.28 -0.55 0.11 0.30 0.35 -0.23 0.29 -0.78 
Eastern Cape -0.07 0.23 -0.30 0.39 0.35 1.12 -0.12 0.22 -0.55 
Northern Cape 0.15 0.27 0.56 -0.10 0.26 -0.39 -0.18 0.26 -0.69 
Free State 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.15 0.23 0.64 -0.29 0.19 -1.50 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.13 0.18 -0.70 0.45 0.22 2.02 -0.47 0.21 -2.24 
North West -0.12 0.19 -0.65 0.24 0.26 0.95 -0.20 0.19 -1.04 
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Gauteng    -0.02 0.16 -0.12 0.32 0.19 1.72 -0.04 0.16 -0.27 
Mpumalanga    0.13 0.20 0.63 -0.08 0.28 -0.27 -0.18 0.22 -0.81 
Limpopo    -0.06 0.22 -0.26 0.24 0.27 0.89 -0.36 0.23 -1.60 
Job union no -0.17 0.09 -1.84 -0.09 0.14 -0.67 -0.15 0.09 -1.61 
Female -0.37 0.10 -3.69 -0.41 0.14 -2.99 -0.49 0.09 -5.50 
White race 0.74 0.11 6.85 0.60 0.13 4.54 0.44 0.10 4.58 
Constant 6.38 0.65 9.75 5.51 0.77 7.18 7.32 0.70 10.45 
  
An attempt was made to estimate the impact of EEA for the full sample of 1997, the 
results are presented in appendix table 1A. In summary the results of the full sample 
are consistent with the disaggregated sample. We find that most of the variables are 
important determinants of real earnings.  
 
For example, age, age squared, and education are statistically significant and are in 
line with our expectation. The age and age squared variables we find that their 
coefficients for both the African and white race group are equivalent with each other. 
Conversely, we find that in the African race group education is a stronger determinant 
for real earnings than in the White race group.  
 
The OLS estimates for 2015 are reported in Table 4.2. These estimates are also 
disaggregated by skilled occupations to account for different characteristics in them. 
What stands out is that the estimated coefficients in Table 4.2 are qualitatively similar 
to the coefficients in Table 4.1 with only a few exceptions. Specifically, levels of 
education, some provincial dummies, race of the individual, whether the individual is 
male or female, age, and age squared are still statistically significant determinants of 
real earnings. 
 
Table 4.2: OLS regression on log of real earnings for 2015 
  Managers Professionals Technician 
  Coef. SE T Coef. SE t Coef. SE t 
Age 0.05 0.02 2.73 0.04 0.02 1.45 0.01 0.02 0.53 
Age2 0.00 0.00 -2.62 0.00 0.00 -1.39 0.00 0.00 -0.63 
Education 0.03 0.01 1.91 0.08 0.03 2.95 0.09 0.02 5.44 
Widow/widower 0.40 0.25 1.59 0.42 0.41 1.01 -0.07 0.24 -0.27 
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Divorce or 
separated 
0.07 0.13 0.52 -0.20 0.23 -0.89 -0.26 0.14 -1.84 
Never married -0.13 0.08 -1.51 0.04 0.10 0.42 -0.17 0.06 -2.77 
Rural 0.25 0.16 1.59 -0.69 0.28 -2.47 -0.48 0.12 -3.91 
Mining & quarry 0.31 0.29 1.10 0.09 0.54 0.16 1.03 0.41 2.51 
Manufacturing 0.33 0.22 1.47 0.29 0.51 0.57 0.61 0.39 1.59 
Construction 0.23 0.24 0.96 0.23 0.52 0.43 0.93 0.41 2.29 
Trade    -0.15 0.21 -0.73 0.27 0.52 0.53 0.77 0.39 1.98 
Transport 0.01 0.24 0.04 -0.23 0.55 -0.42 0.34 0.40 0.86 
Finance    0.18 0.22 0.82 0.21 0.50 0.42 0.69 0.38 1.82 
Services    0.11 0.22 0.49 0.17 0.50 0.34 0.61 0.38 1.59 
Eastern cape -0.47 0.14 -3.45 -0.67 0.19 -3.48 0.16 0.13 1.29 
Northern cape -0.15 0.25 -0.62 0.03 0.38 0.07 -0.08 0.26 -0.29 
Free state -0.39 0.19 -2.10 0.33 0.22 1.53 0.16 0.16 1.00 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.57 0.15 -3.72 -0.27 0.20 -1.35 -0.15 0.12 -1.24 
North west -0.20 0.19 -1.01 -0.47 0.26 -1.86 0.17 0.16 1.03 
Gauteng    0.04 0.09 0.42 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.09 3.00 
Mpumalanga    -0.19 0.16 -1.17 -0.02 0.24 -0.09 0.09 0.14 0.62 
Limpopo    -0.50 0.18 -2.79 0.03 0.26 0.10 0.19 0.17 1.15 
Job union no -0.04 0.08 -0.49 -0.02 0.10 -0.19 -0.16 0.07 -2.42 
Female -0.34 0.06 -5.21 -0.40 0.08 -5.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.65 
White race 0.25 0.07 3.56 0.10 0.08 1.20 0.30 0.06 4.79 
Constant 8.33 0.48 17.3 7.82 0.82 9.50 6.79 0.57 11.94 
 
For example, education level partially resembles the sign and level of significant 
obtained in Table 4.1.  That is, the more educated an individual is the higher earnings 
they will receive (Kaus, 2013). Consistent with the 1997 OLS estimates, gender enters 
with anticipated negative sign as well, at a one percent level of significance. Females 
are still disadvantaged when compared to their male counterparts.  
 
Similarly, the white population group is more advantaged than its African counterpart 
in that their income is more than their counterparts. What is interesting in the results 
for 2015 is that in most occupations, the rural provinces like Eastern Cape, Free State, 
KwaZulu-Natal, and Limpopo still earn less than Western Cape. 
 
By the same token the results for the location dummies is still negatively associated 
with earnings, implying that non-urban dwellers earn less than their urban 
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counterparts. A few dummy job industry variables from the technician occupation are 
statistically significant; mining and quarrying, as well as construction and trade.  
 
These variables have a positive coefficient, which implies that persons working in 
these industries have a higher earning to a person working in the agriculture, hunting, 
forestry, and fishing industry. This implies that these variables have a direct impact on 
real earnings. The non-union membership is expected to have a negative relationship 
with earnings; therefore, we find that in a technician occupation the variable non-union 
has a negative coefficient, which is in line with our thoughts. Further non-union impacts 
real earning as it’s statistically significant.    
 
We also estimated the impact of EEA for the full sample of 2015, the results are 
presented in appendix table 1B. Overall the estimates are quite similar to the earlier 
results in 1997, some are very different.  The age squared variable of the white group 
is insignificant, this implies that age squared of the white race doesn’t impact real 
earnings. Some dummy variables appear to be significant are female, rural area, some 
job industries, provinces, and most of the occupations.  
 
Though the insignificant dummy variables include the following; in the job industry the 
trade, transport, and service variables. Provinces such as the North West, Gauteng, 
and Mpumalanga are also insignificant; to finish manager occupation is also 
insignificant. What is interesting are variables that are only insignificant to the white 
race and not the African race, this comprises of the never married variable as well as 
the non-union variable.  
 
4.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The OLS estimates presented in the previous section do not, by themselves, indicate 
any differences in treatment between whites and Africans. Thus, to quantity that part 
of the race wage gap which is due to differences in characteristics (explained) from 
differences in treatment (unexplained) we use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
decompositions first for the full sample, before disaggregates the sample by 
occupation. 
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Table 4.3 shows the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition estimates of the entire sample by 
race in 1997. As expected, the average earnings of white workers exceed that of 
African workers (refer to the first two rows of the results). Interestingly, the explained 
component is marginally higher than the unexplained component, implying that 
productivity features play an important role than the unexplained features.  
 
Table 4.3: Oaxaca Decomposition regression of average white-African real earnings gap, 
total sample and by occupation 1997 
 Total Sample Manager Professionals Technician 
Overall Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
White 9.02 0.03 9.39 0.07 9.40 0.09 9.07 0.08 
African 7.66 0.01 8.41 0.06 8.52 0.08 8.53 0.05 
Difference 1.36 0.03 0.98 0.09 0.88 0.12 0.54 0.10 
Explained 0.70 0.02 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.10 0.07 
Unexplained 0.67 0.03 0.74 0.10 0.60 0.13 0.44 0.09 
Variables Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Age -0.04 1.31 0.20 -0.17 -0.07 3.61 -0.04 4.84 
Age2 0.02 -0.69 -0.19 0.12 0.07 -1.53 0.02 -2.31 
Education 0.25 0.16 0.19 -1.04 0.24 0.50 0.17 -0.68 
Widow/ Widower 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Divorced/ 
Separated 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 
Never married 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
Rural 0.07 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Mining & 
quarrying 
0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.11 0.00 0.04 
Manufacture 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.16 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.12 
Construction -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 
Trade 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.11 
Transport 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.05 
Finance 0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.13 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.10 
Services 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.26 -0.01 -0.01 
Eastern Cape 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Northern Cape -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
Free State 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.00 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.02 
North West 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.07 
Gauteng 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.06 
Mpumalanga 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.05 
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Limpopo 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06 
Job union no 0.00 0.19 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.21 -0.02 0.14 
Female 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.08 -0.03 
Professionals 0.00 -0.01 
      
Technician 0.00 -0.02 
      
Clerks -0.03 -0.02 
      
Service workers -0.01 -0.01 
      
Skilled 
agricultural 
0.01 0.00 
      
Craft 0.00 -0.01 
      
Plant operators 0.02 -0.02 
      
Elementary 0.07 -0.01 
      
Constant 
 
0.09 
 
2.55 
 
-3.41 
 
-1.68 
 
The estimated coefficients of the effect of the explanatory variables on the unexplained 
and explained components mostly range from negative to one. The estimated 
coefficients which are in region of zero demonstrate an improvement in the gap, while 
those above or closer to unity demonstrate an increase, which extends the gap.  
 
The estimated coefficients of the explained component reveal that all variables such 
as education and some industry dummies (such as, mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, construction and trade, transport, and so forth). Occupational 
dummies, provincial dummies which includes the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Free 
State, KwaZulu-Natal, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo, as well as 
non-union and age, are responsible for closing the earning gap.  
 
The estimated coefficients derived from the unexplained component appear to paint a 
similar picture, the direction and magnitude of the coefficients are mostly retained. 
There is one notable difference between the estimates derived from the explained and 
unexplained components: age and age2. These two variables appear to have 
coefficients closer to unity, suggesting that they are in fact responsible for widening of 
the gap. 
 
Table 4.3 disaggregates the sample by occupation and race for the period 1997. The 
first two rows of the results are similar to the full sample estimates: white workers have 
a greater mean than the African workers in all occupations. The results indicate that 
the difference is larger in the higher income occupation group for example managers 
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have a large earning gap, followed by professionals, and technicians. It also shows 
that the unexplained component is larger, thus the coefficient that is closer to one, 
than the explained component across occupations. The magnitude of the unexplained 
component is relatively larger in the high-income occupation compared to the other 
occupations, which is which is consistent with the full sample. 
 
The contributions of independent variables on the unexplained and explained 
components are illuminating. When looking at the unexplained component, we find 
that the main contributing factors to the gap between whites and Africans are mostly 
age, age squared, and education. The estimate of the latter variable is not surprising 
at all and is in line with many studies in the literature.  
 
For example, Oaxaca (1973) found that education variable is the most important 
explanatory variable in understanding the disparity earnings among different groups 
of people. The remaining variables such marital status, gender, location dummies and, 
industry dummies; which includes mining, manufacture, construction, trade, transport, 
finance, and services. As well as provincial dummies which includes the Eastern Cape, 
Northern Cape, Free State, Kwa Zulu-Natal, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, 
Limpopo, and so forth are fairly close to zero which assists to close the gap.   
 
Has the components of the full sample wage gap and subsample changed across 
time? In order to answer this question, we re-estimate the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition model using the 2015 dataset. The first column of table 4.4 presents 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results of the mean prediction for the entire sample 
by race in 2015. Similar to 1997 we find that the mean for white workers is bigger than 
those of African workers.  
 
Table 4.4: Oaxaca Decomposition regression of average white-African real earnings gap, 
total sample and by occupation 2015 
  Total Sample Manager Professionals Technician 
Overall  Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
White 9.23 0.02 9.96 0.04 9.93 0.05 8.97 0.05 
African 8.22 0.01 9.56 0.05 9.72 0.05 8.58 0.03 
Difference 1.01 0.02 0.40 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.40 0.06 
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Explained 0.73 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.03 
Unexplained 0.28 0.03 0.24 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.31 0.06 
Variables Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Explain 
Unex-
plained 
Age 0.09 0.43 0.31 -1.05 0.17 1.41 0.04 0.16 
Age2 -0.07 -0.22 -0.29 0.48 -0.17 -0.90 -0.05 0.00 
Education 0.10 0.28 0.02 0.17 0.04 -2.47 0.06 -0.02 
Widow/widower 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Divorced/separat 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Never married 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.05 
Rural 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.01 
Mining quarrying -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.04 
Manufacture 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.23 
Construction 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.03 
Trade    0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.13 
Transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 
Finance    0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.68 0.01 0.44 
Services    0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.57 0.01 0.26 
Eastern Cape -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 
Northern Cape 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Free State 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 
North West 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Gauteng    0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.16 -0.01 -0.33 0.00 -0.02 
Mpumalanga    0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Limpopo    0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Job union no -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.12 -0.02 0.19 
Female -0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 
Professionals 0.00 -0.02 
      
Technician -0.11 0.00 
      
Clerks -0.08 0.02 
      
Service workers  0.16 0.00 
      
Skilled 
agricultural  
0.00 0.00 
      
Craft  0.01 0.00 
      
Plant operators  0.15 -0.01 
      
Elementary 0.37 -0.01 
      
Constant 
 
-0.37 
 
0.97 
 
0.86 
 
-1.18 
 
Interestingly, the explained coefficient is significantly bigger than the unexplained 
coefficient, implying that that the characteristics of Africans have improved relative to 
whites after this point, the value of the unexplained component decreased from 0.67 
percent in 1997 to 0.28 percent in 2015.  
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The remainder of the columns of Table 4.4 report the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
by occupation separately. Consistent with the results in Table 4.3, average earnings 
of white workers still exceed that of African workers; although the gap is not as big as 
it was before. Interestingly, once the sample is disaggregated the unexplained and 
explained components appear to follow a similar pattern as the 1997 estimates 
although not as big. 
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5. CHAPTER 5 
5.1. CONCLUSION 
There is an increasing public debate as to whether the earning distribution among the 
White and African race in the labour force improved after the enforcement of the EEA. 
This study endeavoured to assess the effectiveness of the EEA in addressing racial 
wage gap in the South African labour market. This section presents the summary and 
policy implication of the of this research.  
 
5.2. SUMMARY 
This research attempted to investigate the impact that the EEA has in addressing the 
racial wage gap at the top management level in the private sector of the South African 
labour market. Specifically, it attempted to establish the impact that the EEA has in 
narrowing the wage gap at top management level in the private sector of the South 
African labour market by race and occupation. This research used data from two years 
1997 and 2015 from PALMS (PALMS version 3.2). This dataset synchronises various 
labour market variables from various surveys from Statistics South Africa, such as 
OHS, Labour Force Surveys (LFS), QLFS, and Project for Statistics on Living 
Standards and Development (PSLSD).  
 
The empirical analysis commenced with a simple analysis of kernel density estimates 
of the log of earnings by race and occupations, including the skills level of managers, 
professionals, and technicians, for the period of 1997 and 2015. The OLS was also 
used to identify the important determinants of earnings as well. Given the limitations 
of the OLS in this context, the Oaxaca Decomposition was used to decompose wage 
disparity among different race groups. 
 
The OLS estimates of log of real earnings for various occupations for the period of 
1997 showed that certain variables such as age, age squared, level of education, 
gender, race, and provincial dummies, such as KwaZulu-Natal, are important in 
explaining the wage gap. For instance, our variable of interest (race dummy) 
presented a positive and significant estimate on the wage gap.  
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On the other hand, variables such as marital status, residential areas, industry 
dummies, some provincial dummies, and job union membership proved to have no 
impact on the wage gap. Specifically, the results showed that the white race earn more 
than their African counterparts, consistent with our theoretical expectation and in line 
with similar studies in this field such as that of Burger and Jafta (2006).  
 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition regression of the average white-African real 
earnings gap for the total sample and by occupation in 1997 showed that the average 
earnings of white workers exceed that of African workers and the explained 
component is marginally higher than the unexplained component. The estimated 
coefficients of both the explained and unexplained component reveal that variables 
such as education, some industry, occupational, and provincial dummies are 
responsible for closing the earning gap. A notable difference between the explained 
and unexplained components is age and age squared, these two variables in the 
unexplained component appear to have coefficients closer to unity, suggesting that 
they are in fact responsible for winding of the gap.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the results for the sample by occupation and race for the period 1997 
showed that the difference is larger in the higher income occupation group, managers 
have a large earning gap. It also showed that the unexplained component is larger 
than the explained component across occupations and the magnitude of the 
unexplained component is relatively larger in the high-income occupation compared 
to the other occupations, consistent with the full sample. 
 
In 2015 we found that the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results, by full sample were 
similar to 1997, in that the mean for white workers is bigger than those of African 
workers. However, the explained coefficient is significantly bigger than the 
unexplained coefficient, implying that that the characteristics of Africans have 
improved relative to whites after this point.  
 
Regarding the estimate by occupation the average earnings of white workers still 
exceed that of African workers, although the gap is smaller than previously. 
Interestingly, once the sample is disaggregated the unexplained and explained 
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components appear to follow a similar pattern as the 1997 estimates although not as 
big.  
 
5.3. POLICY IMPLICATION 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results by full sample and by occupation depict 
that the EEA has not been fully effective in addressing the racial wage gap of the 
employees at top management level in the private sector of South Africa. The 2015 
results of the full sample indicated that the earning gap among the white and African 
race did not demonstrate a strong improvement from the previous period of 1997. 
 
Nonetheless it was encouraging to find the unexplained component has improved 
overtime and is now smaller than the explained component. Upon disaggregation of 
occupation it is warranted by the mean for the white workers remaining bigger than 
those of the African workers, although the gap is not as big as it was before. The 
difference is larger in the higher income occupation group, such as managers. 
Similarly, the unexplained component reflects larger at the higher income occupations.  
 
It was interesting to observe that disaggregating the earning gap of each skilled 
occupation revealed certain features that were masked by the full sample— the higher 
income occupation, has a larger unexplained component to the explained component.  
 
Therefore, policy makers should pay attention specifically to the managers occupation 
and have a targeted intervention rather than a holistic approach. Over and above this 
the quality of education for the black race should become the primary focus of the 
policy maker, as disparities among white workers and African workers have shifted 
from “pure discrimination” to issues of productivity characteristics such education.  
 
The limitation of this study is that it does not account for the possibility that earnings 
might be observed only if earnings of workers are higher than or equal to the 
reservation wages. Thus, observed wages are not representative of offer wages, and 
are likely to display a particular pattern – sample selection bias and is “frequently 
explained in terms of the observed wages distribution being a ‘truncated’ version of 
the offer wages distribution”.   
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7. APPENDIX 
7.1. Table 1A full sample OLS regression log of real earnings for 1997 
  
  African White 
  Coef. SE t Coef. SE t 
Age 0.04 0.00 9.28 0.04 0.00 9.29 
Age2 0.00 0.00 -7.87 0.00 0.00 -7.72 
Education 0.05 0.00 20.8 0.06 0.00 25.80 
Widow/widower 0.02 0.04 0.39 0.00 0.04 -0.02 
Divorced or separated 0.03 0.04 0.8 0.05 0.04 1.43 
Never married -0.04 0.02 -1.96 -0.09 0.02 -4.84 
Rural -0.17 0.02 -8.91 -0.2 0.02 -10.46 
Mining and quarrying 0.59 0.04 14.49 0.61 0.04 15.27 
Manufacturing 0.55 0.03 17.13 0.53 0.03 16.53 
Construction 0.55 0.04 13.96 0.48 0.04 12.24 
Trade 0.41 0.03 11.98 0.37 0.03 10.99 
Transport 0.52 0.04 12.00 0.52 0.04 12.34 
Finance 0.58 0.04 12.87 0.59 0.04 14.04 
Services 0.38 0.06 6.6 0.32 0.05 6.07 
Eastern cape -0.29 0.05 -6.19 -0.36 0.04 -8.23 
Northern cape -0.33 0.06 -5.73 -0.29 0.05 -5.54 
Free state -0.32 0.04 -7.73 -0.39 0.04 -10.08 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.07 0.04 -1.58 -0.13 0.04 -3.44 
North west -0.11 0.04 -2.48 -0.19 0.04 -4.88 
Gauteng    0.03 0.04 0.84 -0.01 0.04 -0.40 
Mpumalanga    -0.08 0.04 -1.86 -0.16 0.04 -4.04 
Limpopo    -0.12 0.05 -2.54 -0.19 0.04 -4.58 
Job union no -0.32 0.02 -16.42 -0.25 0.02 -13.51 
Female -0.31 0.02 -16.19 -0.31 0.02 -16.53 
Professional 0.05 0.09 0.57 0.02 0.07 0.27 
Technician 0.08 0.07 1.07 -0.08 0.06 -1.42 
Clerk -0.16 0.06 -2.7 -0.33 0.05 -6.61 
Service workers -0.36 0.06 -6.24 -0.59 0.05 -12.28 
Skilled agriculture -0.37 0.07 -5.56 -0.61 0.06 -10.10 
Craft  -0.25 0.05 -4.57 -0.45 0.05 -9.80 
Plant operators -0.20 0.05 -3.72 -0.46 0.05 -9.90 
Elementary -0.37 0.05 -6.92 -0.62 0.04 -13.81 
Constant 7.06 0.11 63.5 7.33 0.10 69.89 
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7.2. Table 1B full sample OLS regression log of real earnings 2015 
  African White 
 
  Coef. SE t Coef. SE t 
Age 0.02 0 3.93 0.03 0.01 2.21 
Age2 0 0 -2.32 0 0 -1.85 
Education 0.04 0 15.82 0.06 0.01 4.38 
Widow/widower 0.07 0.04 1.62 0.07 0.15 0.47 
Divorced or separated 0.06 0.04 1.61 0.13 0.09 1.54 
Never married -0.07 0.01 -4.55 0.01 0.06 0.12 
Rural -0.18 0.02 -8.54 0.54 0.21 2.53 
Mining and quarrying 0.49 0.05 10.41 0.47 0.2 2.42 
Manufacturing 0.14 0.04 3.86 0.34 0.17 2.07 
Construction 0.11 0.04 2.66 0.21 0.18 1.21 
Trade 0.04 0.04 1.16 0.2 0.16 1.24 
Transport 0.04 0.04 0.93 0.06 0.18 0.32 
Finance 0.09 0.04 2.4 0.25 0.16 1.57 
Services -0.05 0.04 -1.29 0.22 0.17 1.32 
Eastern cape -0.32 0.03 -10.15 -0.53 0.09 -6.07 
Northern cape -0.12 0.05 -2.55 -0.26 0.16 -1.63 
Free state -0.28 0.03 -8.62 0.09 0.11 0.8 
KwaZulu-Natal -0.21 0.03 -7.53 -0.52 0.11 -4.59 
North west 0 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.13 -0.3 
Gauteng    0.03 0.02 1.34 0.11 0.06 1.8 
Mpumalanga    -0.01 0.03 -0.26 0.12 0.1 1.17 
Limpopo    -0.16 0.03 -4.88 -0.22 0.14 -1.53 
Job union no -0.11 0.02 -7.22 -0.08 0.06 -1.35 
Female -0.17 0.01 -11.29 -0.32 0.05 -6.08 
Professional 0.01 0.04 0.3 -0.09 0.08 -1.13 
Technician -0.99 0.03 -28.66 -0.89 0.07 -13.14 
Clerk -1.14 0.03 -36.09 -0.92 0.07 -12.96 
Service workers   -1.41 0.03 -45.33 -1.23 0.1 -12.95 
Skilled agriculture -1.43 0.11 -13.46 -1.12 0.59 -1.92 
Craft  -1.29 0.03 -38.69 -1.19 0.08 -14.36 
Plant operators  -1.46 0.03 -43.08 -1.74 0.16 -10.67 
Elementary -1.63 0.03 -52.19 -1.78 0.16 -11.26 
Constant 8.94 0.1 89.43 8.49 0.34 24.89 
 
